which coincides with the twenty-year anniversary of the establishment of the WTO, presents a good opportunity to examine the impacts of the integration of agriculture into the global rules-based trading system, initiated with the Uruguay Round in 1995 and implemented gradually until 2004.
In particular, it aims to answer the question of why trade and the WTO matter for food security. This question is quite relevant at the time when the global community defines new ambitious development goals, especially the Sustainable Development Goal 2, "Zero Hunger" by 2030, and policy makers around the world and public opinion forget the value of a healthy trading system and lean toward isolationist approaches (UNDP 2017) . As shown in Figure 1 .1, the appeal of "free trade" has varied over time. The issue was first raised during the nineteenth century and was fed by political and economic debate, culminating in 1890 with the first peak of effective liberalization before being smashed by a wave of protectionist measures (for example, the McKinley Tariff Act in the United States, the Méline tariff in 1892 in France, and so on). After this harsh history lesson, free trade was resurrected at the end of World War II, and a keen interest in the topic emerged between the mid-1980s and 1995, culminating in the creation of the WTO. Unfortunately, since then, it seems that a new period of doubt has emerged.1 Understanding why we face such a reversal and what it means for our collective future is important.
Some Preliminary Definitions
The basic definition of food security is well known. According to the Food and Agricultural Organization of the United Nations (FAO), food security is reached "when all people have physical and economic access at all times to adequate food or the means for its procurement, without discrimination of any kind" (FAO 2015) . In Chapter 8 of this book, Eugenio Díaz-Bonilla reminds us of the more multidimensional definition of food security: (1) availability; (2) access; (3) utilization; and (4) stability. Looking at this more complex definition, it becomes clear that attaining food security is a major challenge. Food availability depends on domestic production, stocks, and trade. Access to food is influenced by income and employment, and thus by economic growth and development. Utilization of food depends on the quality of food, health services, water and sanitation infrastructure, education, and women's empowerment, among other factors. Finally, stability in food security means that physical and economic access to and proper utilization of food must take place "at all times."
It is particularly important to add the quality dimension to our understanding of food security, going beyond the quantitative challenge of ensuring a certain number of calories consumed every day. The nutritional aspect of the world's diets has gained increased attention from policy makers and development practitioners in recent years. Developing countries can suffer from both undernutrition and overnutrition at the same time; thus, increased income and food consumption will not be sufficient to achieve the world's ultimate nutrition and health goals. Consequently, it is important to also assess the role that international trade can play in people's access to food items of higher nutritional quality and in dietary diversification. As for products other than food products, a key contribution of trade to food consumers' welfare is not only access to goods at lower prices, but also access to wider varieties of products (food from new origins, new cereals or vegetables, fruits all year long, and so on). Recently it was estimated that the number of imported product varieties available in the United States increased by a factor of three between 1972 and 2001; the value to US consumers of this expanded import 1800  1810  1820  1830  1840  1850  1860  1870  1880  1890  1900 1910 1920 1930 1940 1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 Frequency by printed source of "free trade" Word frequency
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variety was evaluated to be 2.6 percent of GDP (Broda and Weinstein 2006) . Finally, fully understanding food security also requires an understanding of poverty. As demonstrated in Chapter 8, these two multidimensional concepts are strongly correlated. Poverty is particularly associated with such "damaging fluctuations" (Sinha, Lipton, and Yaqub 2002) as violence, natural disasters, harvest failure, disease or injury, unemployment or underemployment, and the augmentation of relative food prices. During the 2007-2008 episode of higher and volatile global food prices, many experts emphasized the ensuing risk of increased poverty and food insecurity.
Comprehensively defining food security is complex; defining the global trading system is even harder. We see this system as the set of rules and institutions upon which international trade is based. The system heavily involves the WTO. Three of the WTO's activities are particularly important for international trade. First, the WTO establishes a certain number of clauses and rules (most favored nation status, national treatment, transparency, etc.) that member countries must follow when they trade with others. Second, the WTO organizes periodic multilateral trade negotiations. In 2001 the WTO launched a new round of trade negotiations, with development set as a main objective. These negotiations were called the Doha Development Agenda (DDA) and highlighted the importance of international trade liberalization to economic and welfare gains in developing countries. The Doha Ministerial Declaration stated that "international trade can play a major role in the promotion of economic development and the alleviation of poverty. We recognize the need for all our peoples to benefit from the increased opportunities and welfare gains that the multilateral trading system generates. The majority of WTO members are developing countries. We seek to place their needs and interests at the heart of the Work Programme adopted in this Declaration" (WTO 2001) .
The Doha talks represented the first time that a multilateral trade negotiation focused on the objective of development; however, thus far, the WTO appears to be failing in the delivery of successful new trade liberalization. Chapters 2, 3, 4, and 6 of this book discuss why the Doha Round has failed to come to fruition-and what this means for future negotiations. These chapters also highlight the critical importance of agricultural issues in ongoing trade talks and how the different faces of food security impact global negotiations. For instance, discussions on food security were among the two most important topics during the Bali Ministerial (2013).
The third aspect of the WTO's activities is the Dispute Settlement Unit (DSU), which provides a framework for litigating trade disputes. This makes up a key aspect of the global trading system since the absence of such a mechanism would certainly imply the multiplication of trade wars, with rounds of costly retaliation and counterretaliation. Since 1995, the DSU has litigated (or is currently litigating) 82 agricultural trade disputes out of a total of 485 cases, meaning that agricultural trade disputes account for 17 percent of all disputes. In contrast, international agricultural trade represents only 8 percent of total global trade. This disparity highlights the sensitive, sometimes contentious nature of agricultural trade.2
In addition to the WTO, the global trading system includes various regional agreements and preferential trading regimes. Regional trade agreements result in reciprocal trade between signatory countries, while preferential trade agreements are nonreciprocal, giving developing countries unilateral better access to rich economies' markets. Compatibility between multilateral regimes like the WTO and regional and preferential agreements is one of the major successes of the global trading system. Let us now focus on the relationship between the global trading system and food security. We first try to understand how trade can help in promoting food security and improving nutrition. Then we assess the impact of various trade policy instruments on food security.
How Can Trade Promote Food Security and Improve Nutrition?
It is generally understood that improvements to the global trading system can facilitate trade, which can in turn help to alleviate hunger and improve food security. The theoretical and empirical justifications for this positive relationship between an open trading system and increased food security are well known. However, in different countries the various political and social configurations make this relationship more complex due to market failures, inefficient policy interventions, and political economy constraints. Modern trade economy theory has its roots deeply anchored in the policy debate surrounding the degree of trade openness desired for food products. In his Essay on the Influence of a Low Price of Corn on the Profits of Stock, Ricardo (1815) introduced the key rationales for free trade in food products and formulated the notion of "comparative costs" for the first time. Two years later, he exposed the theory of comparative advantage in On the Principles of Political Economy and Taxation (1817) . In the 1910s, 1920s, and 1930s, Heckscher (1919 and Ohlin (1933) from the Stockholm School of Economics generalized Ricardo's theory and stated that a country has a comparative advantage in goods that intensively use its abundant factors and a comparative disadvantage in goods that intensively use its scarce factors. This theory forms the basis of the pro-free trade vision of classical economists and shows that worldwide production (of food in particular) is more efficient if free trade is implemented. Free trade supports countries' specialization according to the comparative advantage principle, meaning that global food production is increased and average production costs are reduced. At the same time, trade liberalization improves average incomes, ensuring real income gains for the average consumer.
Trade openness alone, however, is not sufficient to ensure improved food security. In the line of the neoclassical theory of international trade, Stolper and Samuelson (1941) offer a precise evaluation of how trade openness can affect remunerations of productive factors. Specifically, international trade benefits the abundant factor of production and hurts the scarce one. In that sense, this theory clearly demonstrates that trade openness could hurt the incomes of the poor in some cases, and in each nation there will be winners and losers. Without explicit redistributive policies, trade liberalization may not be inclusive and the food security of some vulnerable groups may be compromised.
International trade also has varied impacts on the relative price of consumption goods. On one side, the relative price of goods in which a nation has a comparative disadvantage and which it imports decreases with the implementation of free trade. On the other side, the relative price of goods in which a nation has a comparative advantage and which it exports augments with the implementation of free trade. In other words, under a more open trade regime the relative price of food items may either increase or decrease depending on where a country's comparative advantage lies for those items.
These static elements are not the only ones that should be taken into account; when it comes to free trade, there are also dynamic elements that we must consider. For example, since free trade augments the real remuneration of abundant productive factors, it should also accelerate those factors' accumulation. In countries that have a comparative advantage in agricultural goods (products that are intensive in land), the real remuneration of this productive factor should increase, implying an extension of the land area under agricultural cultivation. This in turn increases the specialization of those countries' economies, as well as a more concentrated international supply of food. Further trade integration is also needed from a dynamic point of view to facilitate the transportation and exchange of food and agricultural commodities from countries with excess supply to countries with excess demand. There is a simple reason for this: while national food demand remains stable over time, national food supplies are uncertain, or even unstable, particularly due to changing weather conditions. It is dangerous to think that local food production alone will always be able to satisfy local food demand. Trade is needed to diversify a country's food sources and decrease the risk of a food crisis.
Finally, the demand for food and nutrient diversity is much better satisfied by an open trading system, since international trade offers consumers more varieties of food. This was demonstrated theoretically by Krugman (1979) and Lancaster (1980) and empirically by Deason and Laborde (2015) . The latter study calculates the macronutrients (calories/protein/fat) contents of agricultural trade flows over a long period of time and shows that the nutritional content of international trade has been increasing since 1996, especially for developing countries. Despite its complexities, international trade has thus become an important feature of the global food system, as shown in Figure 1 .2. As of 2015, nearly 20 percent of the calories produced in the world crossed an international border before being consumed. This share was only 12 percent in 1975. It is interesting to note that this share has only marginally increased since 2005, the year that represents the final period of the implementation of the WTO's Uruguay Round and the last major effort to improve the global food trading system.
While the growth of trade in manufactures since 1975 has been explosive, trade in agriculture has progressed more slowly. This point is clearly confirmed by Aksoy (2004), who compares average annual real export growth rates in agriculture (4.9 percent in the 1980s versus 3.4 percent in the 1990s) and in manufactures (5.7 percent and 6.7 percent, respectively), and more recently by Xu (2015) . Using an FAO database, Xu estimates that while world trade in manufactures was more than 8 times larger than agricultural trade in 1997, world production of manufactures was only 3.8 larger than production of agricultural goods. Finally, from the WTO website, we confirm that between 1990 and 2014, exports (in value) of manufactures have increased much more rapidly (multiplying by more than 5) than exports of agricultural products (which have multiplied by only 4.2), even with the recent rise in global agricultural prices. This illustrates the huge potential that exists to use agricultural trade as an instrument to enhance food security.
International trade allows consumers in different parts of the world to access nutritious commodities and improved dietary regimes. One example is the worldwide adoption of quinoa, a nutrient-rich traditional cereal. The story of quinoa may be emblematic of the potential role of international trade in improving food security and nutrition, connecting poor producers in specific regions to global demand through international value chains. Quinoa is a highly nutritious crop rich in protein, dietary fiber, several B vitamins, and essential amino acids and lower in fats than most other crops (Johnson and Ward 1993) . Quinoa is also recognized for its adaptability to various agroenvironmental conditions (FAO n.d.) . Initially quinoa was cultivated only in the Andean region. In the early 1990s, however, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) began "evaluating growth and productivity of several crops in a controlled-environment culture, with the goal of selecting those meeting nutritional needs and exhibiting a manageable growth habit" (Schlick and Bubenheim 1993, 1) for its long-term human space program. At the time, quinoa became recognized as very close to the best standards in terms of nutritional content designed by the FAO.
This launched quinoa on a successful growth trajectory in terms of world trade and consumption. Global trade in quinoa (in volume) multiplied by more than 96-from 590 metric tons to 57,000 metric tons between 1996 and 2014 ( Figure 1.3a ). This explosion in trade was driven by rapidly increasing imports in many developed countries, mainly the United States but also in middle-income countries like Brazil or the Russian Federation, where consumers with increased purchasing power can now access a more diversified food basket (Figure 1.3b ). The international price of quinoa exploded during this Although quinoa is now cultivated in more than 70 countries, the production of quinoa remains highly concentrated in its traditional region-Bolivia, Ecuador, and Peru-and tripled in this area between 1992 and 2010, while the area dedicated to quinoa doubled (FAO n.d.) . Simultaneously, the domestic price of quinoa drastically increased in this region; FAOSTAT indicates that the local producer price of a ton of quinoa increased from $444 in 2004 to $1,163 in 2014 in Bolivia and from $299 to $2,774 in Peru (FAO 2016). The growth in quinoa's popularity and trade volume has several effects for both regional economies and local stakeholders (Romero and Shahriari 2011; Economist 2012) . The huge augmentation of quinoa exports has substantially raised local farmers' incomes in a region considered to be very poor. Bellemare, Fajardo-Gonzalez, and Gitter (2016) find evidence of a positive general equilibrium effect on the Peruvian economy as a whole as a result of rising quinoa prices. However, the expansion in quinoa exports has penalized local consumers, especially poor ones, as a result of the increase of domestic prices. Since quinoa has traditionally formed an important element of local diets in the region, concerns about increasing local malnutrition have emerged alongside quinoa's global growth (Romero and Shahriari 2011) . In addition, with the massive increase of local cultivation has come fear of local environmental damage (Jacobsen 2011) .
The case of quinoa shows how the impacts of international trade on food security can be relatively complex. A boost in national exports to the rest of the world has increased local production and prices. This benefits local producers and global consumers but can hurt domestic consumers if targeted policy responses are not delivered. Let us examine the potential impacts of various trade policy instruments on food security.
What Are the Potential Impacts of Trade Policy Instruments on Food Security?
The concept of food security is complex, implying a combination of food availability, access, and utilization. Availability means low food prices and increased local consumption; access means sufficient incomes and increased purchasing power; and utilization means sufficient health services, water and sanitation infrastructure, and education, among other factors. Table 1 .1 summarizes the short-term impact of six trade policy instruments on local prices, local consumption, local production, public revenues, and world prices. We do not capture the impact of these six instruments on food security itself because food security can be impacted in many different ways by changes in domestic prices, consumption, production, employment, and public revenues and public expenses.
In the case of an import duty, there is less local competition from foreign producers; this implies higher local prices, which support domestic producers but hurt domestic consumers. Import duties also increase public revenues. Thus the impact of an import duty on food security is not clear-cut. Increased local production may support farmers' incomes, and augmented public revenues may improve and expand local infrastructure. These are positive outcomes for food security. Reduced local consumption with increased food prices, however, may hurt food security-particularly for poor populations. Is the effect on producers larger than the effect on consumers? Since the agricultural sector is characterized by net imports, local consumption is greater than local production and the impact of an import duty on food security is thus generally considered to be globally negative. Import duties also decrease demand on world markets, which tends to drive world prices down. This is positive for net buyers abroad and negative for net sellers.
The case of an import quota is similar, except that a quota may or may not generate public revenues depending on how import licenses are distributed. This policy may be considered even more damaging to food security than an import duty because it implies a quantitative restriction to trade, creating shortages without providing additional financial resources to help governments supporting poor consumers.4 An import subsidy is an unconventional trade policy instrument, and it is seldom applied in its simplest form. However, its effects are quite interesting. When imports are subsidized, there is more local competition between local and foreign producers. More competition from abroad means reduced prices and decreased local production but increased consumption and less public revenue. The impact of an import subsidy on consumers is large, and subsidies tend to support food security. Import subsidies also augment both demand and prices on the global market. If exports are subsidized, local producers become more interested in exporting than in supplying their production on the domestic market. Thus, while production increases under this policy, the export subsidy supports exports, not the local food supply. In this case, domestic prices increase and the effect on consumption is negative. So although an export subsidy is beneficial to farmers' incomes, it is detrimental not only to local consumption but also to public revenues. Globally, we may consider export subsidies negative for food security since this instrument supports selling food items abroad and not locally.
An export tax, alternatively, may be positive for food security; this is why export taxes are often implemented in times of food crisis (see Chapters 11 and 12 in this book for a complete discussion of export taxes). When exports are taxed, local farmers become more interested in selling their commodities locally than abroad. This increased supply on the domestic market makes domestic prices go down. While an export tax penalizes domestic producers and could lower farmers' incomes, it benefits both domestic consumers and public revenues. An export restriction (for example, an export ban) has the same consequences as an export tax, except that it may not increase public revenues if export licenses are given freely to domestic producers.
It is important to note that all these policy instruments do not have a single clear-cut, straightforward impact on food security, which is to be expected, as they are primarily aimed at trade, not at food security. On the one hand, import subsidies and export taxes/restrictions can help improve food security, at least in the short term. On the other hand, import duties/quotas and export subsidies are policy instruments that hurt food security. Four remarks are worthwhile here:
1. We have focused only on short-term impacts; in the long term, several effects may take place that cancel out or even reverse these short-term impacts. For example, an export tax decreases domestic prices in the short term, but if it is a long-term policy, it may discourage investment in the agricultural sector and substantially reduce long-term supply, which may in turn augment long-term domestic prices.
2. We have also focused only on the impact of a policy instrument on the sector in which it is applied rather than on other sectors. As an example of how a policy may impact additional sectors, take again the case of an export tax and consider that it is applied on a raw agricultural commodity that is used as an input for a food product. The export tax on the raw commodity may stimulate the production of the food product since the price of its input is decreased; thus, in this case, the export tax plays the role of an input subsidy. In Argentina, for example, the government has long implemented an export tax on soybeans, which has decreased the domestic price of a good that is used as an input by the crushing industry (see Bouët, Estrades, and Laborde 2014) . Thus the production of the manufactured goods (meals and vegetable oil, biodiesel) is increased thanks to this export taxation.
3. Thus far, we have focused only on the impact of one unique policy instrument. The implementation of one of the six policy instruments presented in Table 1 .1 coupled with another policy instrument may have a different impact on food security than the implementation of a single policy alone. For example, consider a case in which the government uses the receipts generated by an import duty to finance cash transfers to the poor. In this case, this policy may have positive, not negative, effects on food security. 4. We have not discussed the underlying redistributive impacts of these policies within each category of agents. For instance, trade policies are not targeted by nature: a price increase will always benefit large producers with a high share of marketed production more than smallholders.
Since the latter group is the one that most policy makers want to support when aiming to reduce poverty and hunger, this represents a serious limitation of these policy instruments.
Clearly, food security is a complex objective to attain, requiring both increased incomes for poor people and lower prices for food items. International trade can boost farmers' incomes in poor countries and can benefit global consumers through lower food prices and enriched diets. However, an expansion of trade may also hurt consumers in the exporting country (by increasing domestic prices) and producers in the importing country. Therefore, assessing the net effects of trade policies on food security requires complex and detailed qualitative assessments. For example, restricting imports is negative as far as food security is concerned because it increases consumption prices for food items. Thus, while an import duty has a positive impact on public revenues and local production, this should not be considered a first-best instrument to achieve these objectives. To increase public revenues, a government should consider the implementation of a direct tax on incomes, taxes on value-added, and so on rather than an import duty that impacts a large share of poor people's expenditures. Similarly, to increase local agricultural production, governments should consider measures to facilitate better market access for local farmers, better access to credit and fertilizers, the expansion of transportation infrastructure, investment in research and development, and other measures to target the real bottlenecks and challenges faced by the country's agricultural value chains.
Overall, there is a cost associated with protectionist policies aimed at achieving food self-sufficiency. Consumers lose more than producers under these policy regimes, while governments gain in profits and taxes. Several studies have evaluated these costs. Beghin, Bureau, and Park (2003) have estimated the cost of food self-sufficiency and agricultural protection in South Korea (Republic of Korea). At the launch of the Doha Development Agenda the Republic of Korea's government had promoted food security as its main objective and was relying on a combination of trade, domestic production, and self-sufficiency to reach that goal. The government massively subsidized local production (at a level corresponding to 75 percent of the value of production in 1999) and imposed nearly prohibitive tariffs in the rice, meat, and dairy sectors. Beghin, Bureau, and Park (2003) have estimated that this subsidization resulted in 15.8 Korean wons in lost consumer incomes for every 10 wonsincrease in farmers' incomes. Globally, this policy cost $4.76 billion annually in resource misallocation. Warr (2005) estimates the impact of a rice import ban in Indonesia, implemented in 2006 to assist poor farmers and reduce poverty. The study uses a general equilibrium model of the Indonesian economy with household disaggregation and a top-down microsimulation. Warr concludes that the rice import ban is equivalent to a 125 percent tariff in terms of incidence on domestic price; this is six times the pre-2004 tariff. Under this ban the incidence of poverty rises by almost 1 percent of the population, and poverty increases in both rural and urban areas. In rural areas only the richest farmers gain from the ban. This seems to be an important effect of many food self-sufficiency policies: the poorest households are harmed more since domestic food prices rise under these policies and because the share that poor populations spend on food is higher.
As this literature illustrates, the objective of food self-sufficiency is costly and may have an antipoor bias. It is also a misleading policy objective, as it is difficult to guarantee that the local food supply will be sufficient to meet local food demand every year. National demand for food is stable because food is a first-necessity good. However, domestic production is clearly not stable. As Chapter 8 highlights, "domestic production in individual countries is far more volatile than global and regional aggregates. " Hazell, Shields, and Shields (2005) conclude that domestic food prices show higher volatility than respective world prices. Díaz-Bonilla, Thomas, and Robinson (2003) show that food trade significantly helps to reduce the volatility of food consumption in developing countries. Minot (2012) examines trends in food price volatility using a database of African staple food prices and finds that price volatility is lower for processed and tradable foods than for nontradable foods. The issue of volatile national agricultural production is further exacerbated by the threat of climate change, including increasing global temperatures and more frequent extreme weather events. International trade certainly has an important role to play in mitigating these negative consequences of climate change (see Chapter 8).
It is important to note that while some trade policies, such as export taxes, may have positive short-term impacts on food security, this positive impact is local. Impacts on these countries' trading partners may be drastically different. An export tax, for example, reduces the food supply on international markets and tends to increase world prices, particularly if the exporting country is large. In other words, countries may try to reduce domestic food prices by increasing the world prices of these goods, consequently increasing prices (other things being equal) at which consumers in other countries can buy these goods. This is typically a beggar-thy-neighbor policy (that is, a policy that is implemented by a government to correct a distortion and improve the national situation but that deteriorates the economic situation of other countries; see Chapters 11 and 12 for further discussion).
Along the same line of thinking, while an export subsidy may increase domestic prices in the country implementing the subsidy, it may also contribute to food security abroad by easing access to food and reducing local prices in food-importing countries. Of course, the same subsidy has a vastly different impact on foreign food-exporting countries since it induces a contraction of their export revenues. The analysis presented here is preliminary, but it helps provide a framework for the rest of this book to examine the complex relationship between trade and food security in more detail. With this framework in place, we now paint a picture of the state of the world's distortionary trade policies today. First we look at traditional distortionary policies, such as import duties, export subsidies, and domestic support measures (policies that tend to decrease world prices); then we look at such policies as export taxes/ restrictions, food reserves, and biofuel mandates, which tend to increase world prices and have become more favored by countries worldwide since the 2007-2008 food crisis.
Trade and Agricultural Policies Today: A Tour d'horizon of Traditional Distortionary Policies
Under the category of traditional distortionary policies, we include protection at the border, particularly import duties, and measures of domestic support. These distortionary policies have traditionally been the object of negotiations at the WTO or in other trade agreements. Chapters 2, 4, and 6 present a global picture of trade policies today. Chapter 6 shows that based on the MAcMapHS6v2.1 database, the average duty on imports in 2004 was at 4.6 percent. This level is slightly lower today (Bureau, Guimbard, and Jean 2016) , clearly indicating that tariff protection is currently low-on average reaching 4.2 percent in 2013. However, this finding hides high levels of protection in some sectors and some countries. For example, the average global duty on imports of agricultural products is estimated at 16.4 percent; the average global duty on imports on industrial products is estimated at 3.9 percent. Tariff protection is particularly high in the sugar, meat, dairy, cereal, and vegetable and fruit sectors. This fact is of course especially important for this book's focus on the relationship between international trade and food security.
Average overall protection is also close to 10 percent in least developed countries (LDCs), which is higher than in middle-income countries (8.6 percent) and much higher than in high-income countries (3 percent). It is worth mentioning, however, that the average tariff protection on agricultural goods is higher in middle-income countries (18.3 percent) than in LDCs (11.6 percent). These findings give a more accurate picture of the current state of global trade policies: a world with average low import duties but with high protection remaining in agricultural sectors and in LDCs. If we define trade policies as the set of policies at the border-that is, import duties and other import restrictions, exports subsidies and taxes, and so on-we consider agricultural policies to include all other types of policies that affect agriculture. These consist of policies that support domestic demand for agricultural commodities, such as nutrition programs and biofuel mandates; direct market price supports that raise market prices; direct payments that raise farmers' incomes through income transfers; input subsidies; and loss compensation programs such as crop insurance and disaster assistance (Glauber and Effland forthcoming) .
Under the WTO's Agreement on Agriculture (AoA), signed in 1995, all WTO members are obliged to report two categories of domestic support in order to measure the distortionary impact of these policies on global trade: notifications related to the calculation of the current total aggregate measurement of support (AMS), considered to be major sources of distortions and for which spending is disciplined (the Amber Box category); and notifications related to new or modified domestic support measures for which exemption from reduction is claimed. The latter category is mainly constituted by the Green Box category and is considered to have minimal trade-distorting impacts. Green Box measures include measures of support not tied to production or market prices, such as agricultural research and training programs or payments to farmers related to environmental practices. Other exempted policies include Blue Box measures, which are trade-distorting programs that include conditions to reduce those distortions (for example, a Blue Box measure may have a condition that limits production); developmental measures (the Development Box-for example, investment subsidies in developing countries, agricultural input subsidies for resource-poor producers, and so on); or other distortionary payments up to 5 percent of the total value of production (the de minimis; this threshold is increased to 10 percent for a developing country).
At the beginning of the Doha Round, trade-distorting policy instruments were heavily used by advanced economies to support their farmers. The European Union has traditionally been thought of as the WTO member with the most important Amber Box program. However, the European AMS fell from 81 billion euros in 1995 to 5.9 billion euros in 2012-2013; the WTO's cap on this program is 72.2 billion euros per year. This means that today the European Union is complying with its WTO obligation on domestic support. Simultaneously, the EU's Green Box program has expanded and stood at 71.1 billion euros in 2012-2013. Thus it can be concluded that the European Union's agricultural policy has a significantly less distortionary impact on world markets than it did 20 years ago, not only because of the adoption of less distortionary policy instruments but also because the EU is a less powerful agricultural economy today (Matthews 2014) .
Concerning the United States, the AMS cap on Amber Box program subsidies is currently at $19.1 billion. The country's total agricultural support programs, conservation programs, and crop insurance programs are estimated to be more than $200 billion for fiscal years 2016-2025 (Glauber and Effland forthcoming). It is often concluded that US domestic support has moved away from direct interventions like price support programs to measures more decoupled from actual production and to insurance programs. Consequently, many argue that today's US agricultural policy is less distortionary to trade (Orden and Zulauf 2015) . However, its high cost and resilience is also underlined (Glauber and Effland forthcoming).
Agricultural insurance programs have often been motivated by the desire to provide incentives for expanded agricultural production, thereby improving food security. The use of insurance programs has increased drastically since the end of the 1980s. One reason for this growth could be the potential exemption of insurance programs from WTO reduction commitments and a regime of higher but more volatile world prices since 2005. Chapter 10 presents the evolution of these insurance programs in developed and developing countries and examines their treatment under the WTO, noting that insurance subsidies could come under increased WTO scrutiny and challenge in the future. In emerging economies such as Brazil, China, India, and the Russian Federation, notifications of domestic support for agriculture point to increasing levels of support (see Chapter 5). However, as shown in Chapter 5, there are significant differences between these four economies. While agriculture and food account for an important share of Brazilian exports, this share is relatively low in China, India, and the Russian Federation. There are also strong differences in the participation of these countries in WTO governance and negotiations. Since 1995, Brazil's participation in the WTO Dispute Settlement Unit has been forceful; this country has been demanding freer agricultural trade and was very active in the G20 group that requested substantial cuts in agricultural tariffs by developed countries.5 India's position, however, has been drastically different: its government has given priority to 5 This G20 group in the WTO agricultural negotiations is distinct from the G20 group of major economies brought together regularly to address global economic issues. a food security agenda with "special" products exempted from liberalization and a "special safeguard mechanism" aimed at handling price variations and import surges (see Chapter 2). While Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries have significantly cut their domestic support to agriculture over the past 30 years, this support has markedly increased in emerging economies (see Chapters 2 and 5). However, as far as support to agriculture is concerned, emerging countries make up a heterogeneous group. Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Israel, Kazakhstan, South Africa, Ukraine, and Viet Nam have relatively low levels of support, while China, the Russian Federation, and Turkey have support levels closer to the OECD average, and Indonesia has levels much higher than that average (OECD 2016) .
Overall, between 2001 and 2015, trade-distorting policies (traditionally tariffs and domestic support) evolved significantly. Even without the conclusion of the Doha Round, tariff liberalization has continued, not only through the conclusion of regional trade agreements but also, and maybe more important, thanks to the end of the completion of the Uruguay Round and unilateral liberalization. In the European Union and the United States, domestic support has moved away from trade-distorting policies toward Green Box policies (that is, nondistortionary or less distortionary measures). In emerging economies, meanwhile, domestic and market price support has clearly been augmented, particularly in China and Indonesia. All of these policies are supposed to put downward pressure on the world price of agricultural commodities. For the past 10 years, however, several countries, including key exporters, have given priority to policies that instead put upward pressure on world prices.
Trade and Agricultural Policies Today: New Issues
Since 2005, a new issue has emerged in the debate regarding trade policies. While traditional trade talks were focused on measures reducing world prices (such as import restrictions and export subsidies), both at-the-border and beyond-the-border policies were contributing to higher world prices by reducing supply or strengthening demand. Many countries now use policies such as export taxes and export restrictions. Piermartini (2004) noted that approximately one-third of WTO members imposed export duties. More recent research (Bouët, Estrades, and Laborde 2013) has shown that the average export tax on global merchandise trade was 0.48 percent in 2007. The same study found that export taxes are concentrated on raw agricultural products, minerals, processed oilseeds, aluminum and iron, and timber, with the bulk of these taxes imposed on energy products. Finally, using a Computable General Equilibrium (CGE) estimation, it is concluded that removal of all export taxes leads to an overall gain of 0.24 percent in world real income, or $133 billion per year by 2020, and expands world trade volumes by 2.8 percent compared to their 2020 levels in the baseline.
Two factors help explain the growing importance of export restrictions. First, as stated earlier, export taxes or export restrictions may help fight food insecurity by decreasing local food prices. Second, the WTO does not prohibit export taxes and other forms of export restrictions. More precisely, as Crosby (2008, 3) has stated: "General WTO rules do not discipline Members' application of export taxes," but "they can agree-and several recently acceded countries, including China, have agreed-to legally binding commitments in this regard." Chapters 11 and 12 analyze the use of export restrictions during the 2007-2008 food crisis and show that these were typically beggar-thyneighbor policies, intended to improve food security at home at the cost of food security abroad.
Even if the growth of biofuel markets over 2000-2009 is an important evolution of agricultural markets, this book does not include a specific chapter on this topic, for several reasons. First, biofuel programs represent a policydriven demand shock on world agricultural prices, and as such they have no specific implications about how the world trading system rules should be revised or adjusted to deal with external shocks or policy reforms. Of course, biofuel mandates influence international trade, but they are not trade policy instruments and their indirect impacts have contrasting impacts among trade partners. Aside from food security issues, these policies have certainly caused a significant shock that influences the production and trade of other goods-for example, such substitutes as palm oil may have been expanded due to the contraction of rapeseed oil availability. However, this remains a demand shock, like the increase of demand for food from Asia, a food stamp program, or the increase in world population. All these shocks affect the world trading system, and demand-driving policies are difficult to discipline, especially when they operate at market prices (see in Chapter 9 for an important discussion of this issue). To guide policies, the key issue is to understand how the world trading system and its rules, as they are designed today, may react to these shocks. Seen in this light, export taxes/restrictions are a primary aspect of the world trading system, since they belong to the set of trade policy instruments and their implementation clearly amplifies an initial shock (for example, a biofuel mandate) on world agricultural markets (see Chapters 11 and 12).
Second, although the support for biofuel production has intensified after 2001, this support is starting to wane and rapid growth of the recent years will not continue. Raising interest in biofuels was certainly related to the spikes in oil price seen in 2005-2008 and 2010-2014, the initial expectations in terms of carbon emissions reductions, and the goals of promoting energy security based on domestic supply.6 In particular, the United States and the EU implemented significant programs to support the domestic production of biofuel. In the United States two programs have historically been important: the Renewable Fuel Standard (RFS), which imposed a floor on the demand for ethanol and biodiesel, and the blender tax credit, which increased the market value of ethanol. The blender tax credit for ethanol and duties on ethanol imports were recently eliminated, and the RFS mandates established in 2007 have been relaxed (Glauber and Effland forthcoming) .
In Europe biofuel policies were implemented through the Renewable Energy Directive (RED), which included a (percentage) target for the use of renewable energy in road transport fuels by 2020. In 2009 this target was fixed at 10 percent. The RED also established biofuel sustainability criteria with which all biofuels produced or consumed in the EU have to comply. After considering environmental and food price externalities (Laborde 2011) during several years of debate, the EU significantly reshaped its policy in 2016 by capping the share of energy consumption in road transportation made from food-crop feedstocks at 7 percent. In recent years this policy change has curbed Europe's biofuel demand while a similar movement took place in the United States, driven by both the blend wall (the upper bound technical limit on the blending rate tolerated by most of the cars currently used) and the shift of Renewable Fuel Standard 2 (RFS 2) legislation away from corn ethanol to favor advanced biofuels. Other countries have implemented programs aimed at supporting the local production of biofuel, including Argentina, Brazil, China, Japan, and the Republic of Korea. In the case of Brazil, some argue that consumption of biofuel is driven by relative prices between ethanol and gasoline (due in particular to Brazil's large and growing fleet of flex fuel cars) rather than by government policies (Al-Riffai, Dimaranan, and Laborde 2010) .
A review of the literature on biofuels shows that strong conclusions in terms of policy recommendations are difficult to support, since the impact of biofuel programs on agricultural prices is uncertain. On the one hand, a substantial part of the literature concludes that biofuels policies have played a significant role in the food price spike. De Gorter, Drabik, and Just (2013) show that US and other OECD countries' biofuel policies have played a prominent role in linking food-grain commodity prices and biofuel prices, as well as in the price spike for corn, oilseeds, wheat, and rice between 2006 and 2012. Wright (2014, 75) clearly blames biofuel policies for increased agricultural price volatility: "The cause of [the rise in food prices] was no perfect storm. Far from being a natural catastrophe, it was the result of new policies to allow and require new use of grain and oilseed for production of biofuels." Condon, Klemick, and Wolverton (2015) conclude that increased ethanol production explains about one-third of the increase in corn prices from 2007 to 2010. Using the IFPRI IMPACT model, Rosegrant (2008) estimates that 30 percent of the 2000-2007 increase in weighted average grain prices was due to biofuel production. He even concludes that biofuels explain almost 40 percent of the 2000-2007 increase of the price of maize. However, this is no consensus.
On the other hand, Babcock (2011) affirms that from 2005 to 2009 the impact of US ethanol subsidies on food prices and food quantities was "quite modest." Based on a time-series analysis linking food and fuel prices, Zilberman et al. (2012) show (1) that changes in biofuel prices have little impact on food prices, (2) that the impact varies across crops and locations, and (3) that biofuels have not been the most important factor of increasing food prices. Hochman et al. (2014) underline the role of a declining stockto-use ratio since 1985. Similarly, all simulations conducted at IFPRI with MIRAGE-BioF conclude that biofuel mandates have only a small impact on food prices. Dimaranan, Valin, and Bouët (2010) develop a biofuel version of the MIRAGE model to evaluate the environmental benefits of ethanol policies in the United States and the EU under different trade policy options and show that ethanol production has environmental benefits only under certain restrictive assumptions.
Using the same model plus modifications concerning improved data and coproducts, Al-Riffai, Dimaranan, and Laborde (2010) evaluate the impact of EU and US biofuel mandates on global agricultural and biofuel markets. They conclude that these mandates have a positive impact on agricultural value-added and greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions and a limited impact on food prices (less than 1 percent impact on the consumer food price index for all regions in the world), although some commodities can see higher impacts (up to +20 percent for some oilseeds). Brazil is found to benefit from increased biofuel production and exports; in addition, the use of cropland for biofuel production significantly increases in this country. Laborde and Valin (2012) improve the sector database and the modeling of the agricultural supply function and land-use change to study the environmental implications of the EU biofuel mandate. They question the sustainability of the EU biofuel program, particularly its biodiesel component and therefore the cost-benefit advantage for the EU and the world to achieve greenhouse gas savings through this instrument.7
While the literature is unanimous in concluding that biofuel mandates play a role in increasing agricultural prices, it is not consensual on the magnitude of the impact and even more uncertain on the food security implications. Indeed, higher food prices will support agricultural investments, R&D, and so on. Most of the literature considers that a key issue was the quick increase in biofuel consumption, which fostered the price peaks, while long-term effects will be milder. As discussed earlier, the future will not see a similar pattern affecting the biofuel markets again. Although an interesting discussion, sparked by the biofuels example, would be to analyze how the global trading system should be adjusted to support a sustainable bioeconomic pathway in future decades, it goes beyond the scope of this book, which is primarily focused on ongoing trade negotiation challenges.
Another policy instrument is at the heart of today's WTO debate. Food stocks are a final factor receiving increased attention in the trade and agricultural policy debate, thanks to the 2007-2008 global food crisis and the growing international concern regarding food security. As explained in Chapters 8 and 9, there are different types of food stocks: emergency food stocks, which cope with disruptions in domestic or international food supply; food redistribution stocks, which support the distribution of food through a variety of programs; and buffer stocks, which aim to stabilize prices. Emergency food stocks and food redistribution stocks may be needed for a global policy targeting food security. Buffer stocks are more difficult to justify, however, and research has concluded that they are costly and often inefficient at stabilizing prices (see Chapters 8 and 9). At the WTO Bali Ministerial Conference in 2008 the issue of food stocks derailed talks until a peace clause was signed (see Chapter 9).
Where Does This Book Fit into the Debate?
In the context of the framework and historical timeline laid out in this introduction, the rest of the book focuses on two important elements of the relationship between the global trading system and food security: the Doha Development Agenda (DDA) and whether food price volatility can be managed through trade instruments. The DDA has placed international priority on development, an objective upon which every nation should agree. In 2001, when the DDA was launched, it was expected that trade liberalization could help support development and fight poverty and food insecurity worldwide. Fifteen years after the start of these negotiations, however, the round is still not yet completed.8 Are the reasons for this failure political or economic? What are the policy instruments and/or sectors on which progress or failure hinges? What are the costs associated with a non-Doha Round? A successful DDA would lead to substantial gains for the world in general and for developing countries in particular by continuing the reduction in global distortions and limiting policy uncertainties.
While agriculture has been a part of the rules-based global trading system since the implementation of the Uruguay Round, the 2000s brought new concerns in terms of global food security. During the second part of that decade, the world experienced a significant increase of food price levels. Chapter 9 illustrates that today's nominal food prices in US dollars are above those seen in previous decades. Many observers are also seeing an increase in food price volatility; this refers to variation over time in the price of food rather than to the level of these prices. For example, Minot (2012) compares price volatility in international markets during 1980-2006 with price volatility during 2007-2010 and finds a significant increase in the volatility of the price of rice, wheat, and maize as well as of the International Monetary Fund Food Price Index.9
However, a close look at a more sophisticated measure of volatility, such as the extreme volatility method proposed by Martins-Filho and Torero (2016) , shows that while episodes of extreme international price volatility existed for several crops (maize and wheat in particular) in the summer of 2002 and again in 2006-2011, such events have remained limited over the past 15 years. In addition, price volatility was higher in the 1970s. Specific efforts have been made to improve the information surrounding these events, such as the Agricultural Market Information System (AMIS) initiative supported by the G20, to help prevent future instances of extreme price volatility. Many countries responded to high international food price levels and increased international food price volatility through the use of trade policy instruments, either by restricting exports or by decreasing import duties. However, this book concludes that these policies are not the appropriate response for several reasons:
(1) although export taxes/restrictions decrease domestic prices, they contribute to higher world prices;
(2) trade policies should be used for treating trade issues (which food price volatility is not); (3) in terms of economic theory, there are more direct instruments (such as investments in food supply and research and development) with which to address supply-side problems, while safety nets and cash/in-kind transfers can help poor households cope with augmented food prices.
This book does not cover all aspects of the global trading system. For instance, norms and other nontariff barriers to trade are not discussed in this book. Nontariff barriers are important impediments to the free circulation of merchandise in general and of agricultural goods in particular. Kee, Nicita, and Olarreaga (2009) estimate that in the early 2000s, the simple average ad valorem equivalent of all worldwide nontariff barriers was 12 percent. Disdier, Fontagné, and Mimouni (2008) study the impact of sanitary and phytosanitary (SPS) barriers and technical barriers to trade (TBT). They indicate that in 2004, among the 154 importing countries in their database, only 92 notified SPS and TBT measures. In addition, of more than 690 agricultural and food products in their database, only 4 of these products did not face any barrier in any importing country. They also show that SPS and TBT measures significantly reduce agricultural imports to the OECD from developing countries. However, norms and other nontariff barriers to trade are not at the center of the DDA talks, nor do they contribute actively to the price volatity issue. As these are the two main axes of this book, the issue of these barriers are not discussed.
This book is the first in a series coming out of the Markets, Trade, and Institution Division of the International Food Policy Research Institute. It is composed of research conducted at IFPRI by a group of researchers studying trade issues. It consists of thirteen chapters, six of which have recently been published in academic journals; seven chapters are new. The first section of the book, "What Can the Doha Development Agenda Deliver, and How Can It Fail?" is based on the premise that more trade integration can fight poverty and alleviate hunger. This section shows the advantages for the world and developing countries offered by a successful DDA (see Chapters 3 and 6). However, it also provides a more unconventional view: more liberalization of trade under the auspices of the WTO may protect the world against the adverse consequences of protectionist policies, to the benefit of developing countries in particular (see Chapter 6). Why could the DDA fail? There are many reasons for this potential, if not probable, failure. First, the number of participants in the negotiations has significantly increased since the start of the talks, making it difficult to find a solution that is acceptable for every country. In addition, the issues being treated are much more complex than those discussed during previous rounds (see Chapters 2 and 3). Moreover, these multilateral trade negotiations are no longer a confrontation between a group of rich countries specialized in industry and services and a group of poor countries specialized in agriculture. The latter group of countries in particular has developed more heterogeneous preferences in terms of the potential outcomes of the round (see Chapters 2 and 5). Finally, it is likely that the negotiators of the Doha Agenda have selected tariff-cutting formulas that are efficient from an economic viewpoint but that may imply very high political costs; such political reasons matter even if more economic efficiency is to be reached (see Chapter 4).
In "The Doha Round: Virtuous Circle or Infinite Loop?" (Chapter 2), David Laborde analyzes the ongoing process of the Doha Round-from its inception in December 2001 to the current deadlock. The chapter provides a short history of the past 15 years of trade negotiations and a political-institutional explanation of their failure. In "Why Is the Doha Development Agenda Failing? And What Can Be Done?" (Chapter 3), Antoine Bouët and David Laborde make an intensive utilization of the MIRAGE model of the world economy to provide a strategic analysis of the failure of this round of negotiations based on game theory. The analysis states that there is no outcome that can increase the payment of all players simultaneously. While game theory offers potential ways to escape this stalemate (such as establishing international transfers, extending the domain of negotiations, or excluding some countries from the negotiations), no solution appears implementable for the Doha Round. This raises the question: Is there all the reason in the world to be pessimistic?
In "Formulas for Failure? Were the Doha Tariff Formulas Too Ambitious for Success?" (Chapter 4), David Laborde and Will Martin focus on tariff-cutting formulas, a key element of the trade negotiations. They explain that the DDA's tariff-cutting formulas were selected based on economic efficiency, meaning these formulas sharply reduce the highest tariffs. However, this approach may also generate very high political costs, which could pose a challenge to the desired economic efficiency. The agricultural policies of Brazil, the Russian Federation, India, and China (BRIC) are scrutinized by Lars Brink, David Orden, and Giselle Datz in Chapter 5 ("BRIC Agricultural Policies through a WTO Lens"), with particular attention paid to their compatibility with WTO rules. The chapter stresses that although the BRIC countries are often referred to as a unified group, their interests concerning the agricultural sector greatly differ. What are the gains expected from a Doha Round? This issue has often been studied in the economic literature, particularly with the use of multicountry, multisector Computable General Equilibrium (CGE) models such as MIRAGE. This type of modeling exercise is used to compare the world economy with and without a DDA; the economic model simulations with DDA usually lead to small worldwide gains. In "Assessing the Potential Cost of a Failed Doha Round" (Chapter 6), Antoine Bouët and David Laborde offer a new way to evaluate the DDA by comparing a resort to protectionism when the DDA is implemented with a resort to protectionism when the DDA is not implemented. Their results see greater economic benefits from the potential agreement.
One sector is emblematic of the nexus between agriculture and development in the global trade system and the difficulties of current trade negotiations: the cotton sector. At the beginning of the DDA, four African countries (Benin, Burkina Faso, Chad, and Mali) denounced the support given by rich countries' governments to those countries' own local cotton producers, a support that is thought to depress world cotton prices, reduce production in developing countries by limiting farmers' access to inputs, and consequently decrease the income of tens of millions of poor households. In Chapter 7 ("Domestic and Trade Policies Affecting the World Cotton Market"), Fousseini Traoré provides a thorough analysis of the world's cotton sector, with particular focus on how this sector has been treated during the DDA negotiations. Cotton is important for food security since its production makes up the main source of income for many poor people in West African economies. The cotton sector is also emblematic of the political economy of trade negotiations: how a sector of small importance for rich economies, but with highly concentrated interests, can lead to a failure of negotiations even though the potential benefits of liberalization for some poor developing countries are high.
The second part of the book, "Successful and Failed Trade Instruments for Managing Price Volatility," examines whether the management of price volatility is achievable through more or less trade integration. This section deals in particular with the instruments available for policy makers to cope with price volatility: food stocks, crop insurance, and export restrictions. All of these instruments are topics of discussion within the WTO since they all affect international trade. Similarly, all of these policy instruments were used by various countries during the recent food crisis (2007) (2008) to preserve domestic food security. From a general point of view, this section aims to demonstrate that the use of such instruments is not necessarily the best way to react to increased global price volatility. In two consecutive chapters, Eugenio Díaz-Bonilla offers an extensive view on food security stocks. In "Food Security Stocks: Economic and Operational Issues" (Chapter 8), Díaz-Bonilla discusses several economic and operational aspects of the constitution and use of public stocks for food security in developing countries. The chapter proposes a policy approach that would limit the active role of trade policy and would support improved land and water access for small producers as well as substantial investment in human capital, infrastructure, and agricultural R&D. Chapter 9, "Food Security Stocks and the WTO Legal Framework," studies the legal issues posed by the WTO texts on public stockholding for food security purposes. It provides the background of the debate and gives two interpretations of the interim solution agreed upon at Bali in 2013.
A less well-known policy instrument aimed at supporting farmers against price instability is crop insurance. In "Agricultural Insurance and the WTO" (Chapter 10), Joseph W. Glauber describes the increasing popularity of these programs, particularly in developed countries. One key explanation for this growth in popularity is the fact that these policies are supposed to be exempt from reduction since they are being classified in the Green Box. However, Glauber examines in detail the treatment of agricultural insurance under the WTO and shows that some of these policies have recently been challenged. This implies that such programs may become less effective as an instrument to countervail price volatility. Another popular policy instrument in times of higher food price volatility is export restriction. This policy was particularly common during the 2007-2008 food crisis and was often used at the same time that food-importing countries were decreasing their import duties. Both policies-raising export restrictions and decreasing import duties-aim to help consumers rather than producers. The last two chapters of the book evaluate the economic consequences of such policies.
The first evaluation of export restrictions is conducted using a series of partial-equilibrium models. In Chapter 11, "A Quantitative Analysis of Trade Policy Responses to Higher World Agricultural Commodity Prices," T. Edward Yu, Simla Tokgoz, Eric Wailes, and Eddie C. Chavez conclude that "trade policies implemented by those major trading countries will usually create more price pressure on the poorer food-deficit countries/regions that are less capable of manipulating their trade policies." In Chapter 12, "Food Crisis and Export Taxation: The Cost of Noncooperative Trade Policies," Antoine Bouët and David Laborde use the MIRAGE model of the world economy to explore the trade and economic consequences of these policies. The chapter illustrates how increased export taxes in large net food-exporting countries and reduced import tariffs in large net food-importing countries, in the dynamics of retaliation and counterretaliation, can contribute to successive increases of global agricultural prices and can thus harm small net food-importing countries. The path to the objective of worldwide food security remains long. Reaching this objective will require not only the implementation of policy instruments in different dimensions of economic policy but also international coordination of these policies.
